Best known as a jurist of the Shâfiî school and a scholar of Logic, Sirâj al-Dîn al-Urmawî lived much of his life in Ayyubid-era Cairo before moving to Konya (in 655/1257), where he served as the “Chief Kâdî” for the rest of his life. He was also an important figure within the “mutaakhkhirîn”-era Islamic thought, whose fundamental phisolophical framework had been established by Fakhr al-Dîn al-Râzî (d. 606/1210), after Avicenna (d. 428/1037) and al-Ghazâlî (d. 505/1111). Philosophically, al-Urmawî was known to have been influenced by two particular figures: his mentor Kamâl al-Dîn ibn Yûnus (d. 639/1241), and his colleague and friend Afdal al-Dîn al-Hûnajî (d. 646/1249). An important work to resort to for understanding Urmawi’s philosophical views is his Latâ’if al-hikma, which he wrote in Persian and dedicated to the Anatolian-Seljukid Sultan Izz al-Dîn Kaykâvus II (r. 1246-1257). Written in a complementary manner to Fakhr al-Dîn al-Râzî’s incomplete al-Latâif al-ghiyâthiyya, this book also contains autobiographical information about the author. Though the book consists of two main parts, including “theoretical wisdom” and “practical wisdom,” it represents a new genre that is a kind of “mixture” of philosophy and theology (kalâm). This article examines al-Urmawî’s philosophical views in the context of the intellectual tradition that he inherited and with a focus on his Latâ’if al-hikma.

This article discusses the intellectual transformation of the Indian Sub-Continent after Shah Walî Allah of Delhi, focusing particularly on the views of Muhammad Iqbal, whose perspective on the ijtihâd radically differed from the classical view. It aims to show that some intellectuals from Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan to Muhammad Iqbal discussed ijtihad and taqlid outside the context of the Fiqh. Moreover, the paper discusses the reactions to this “different” ijtihad approach by some scholars known as the followers of Shah Walî Allah. The paper thus tries to demonstrate the transformation of certain concepts and categories of classical Islamic civilization in the modernization period in the case of the concepts of ijtihad and taqlid.

Because the ijtihad is a dynamic tool for finding sharia-based solutions to emerging problems, the debates over “whether it is permissible for a given era to be devoid of a mujtahid” and over “whether the ‘gate of ijtihad’ is closed” have always remained vibrant throughout the history of the fiqh. This article will examine Juwaynî’s al-Ghiyâthî, a work on “al-Ahkâm al-Sultâniyya” (the Rules of Government), in order to discuss his perspective on the changing characteristics of the jurists (fuqahâ), who had derived the sharia rulings from the essential Islamic sources and transmitted them to the general public since the time of the Companions, and his take on the imaginary situation of the absence of the fuqaha in society. Within this framework, the article will first discuss Juwaynî’s views on the continuity between different generations of the fuqaha, how the earlier jurists’ views were understood and received by the later generations, and how the new rulings would be applied to the new questions that emerge with the passage of time. The article will then examine Juwaynî’s proposals on the method to be applied in case when the muftis with a license for the ijtihad and the ulema who are able to transmit the particular views of madhabs disappear, and therefore religious rulings might be completely unknown to the general public.

Mabâhith al-alfâz, contain the rules which are needed for understanding and interpretation of religious texts. Because of that these topics are one of the important topics in Usûl al-fıqh literature. Who he had classified these topics in Hanafî Usûl al-fıqh literature is Abû Zaid al-Dabûsî. This classification is carried out by Sarakhsî. Than Fahr al-Islam al-Pazdawî combined these topics in a top category and carried them to the title of “Kitâb/Qur’ân”. In addition, al-Pazdawî, examined first the definitions of the whole terms existent in this classification before entering to full explanation and discussion. This classafication that had given its final shape by al-Pazdawî was accepted and preserved until today, by late period Usûl al-fıqh Hanafî scholars; although some differences in detail. However, there are some aspects open to critique at this classification for the logical classification criteria purposes. Some scholars as Abd al-Azîz al-Bukhârî, Ibn al-Humâm, Sadr al-Sharî‘a and Taftâzânî pointed out part of the critiques. However this article focuses on these critiques and proposes some suggestions to make the classification more consistent logically. Some of these suggestions belong to classical period scholars and some of them belong to us.

The author of al-Mabsût, one of the most important and comprehensive legal sources in the Hanafî school, al-Sarakhsî systematically explained the Hanafî fiqh methodology, including its view of the sunnah and hadith, in his book Usûl al-Sarakhsî, which he wrote as an introduction to his al-Mabsût. The sunnah refers, according to Sarakhsî, to the path the Prophet and his companions followed in the religion of Islam. Constituting the second basic source of the sharia, the sunnah for him consists of mashhûr and mutawâtir narrations implying absolute or near-absolute truth. Akhbâr al-wâhid, on the other hand, are considered within the scope of the sunnah inasmuch as they are compatible with the Qur’ân and Sunnah despite their lack of certainty; otherwise they are deemed gharîb or shâzz (weak narration) and thus rejected. Sarakhî’s view on the preconditions for a narrator is on the whole in line with the traditional hadith methodology. The main diference lies in his emphasis on the jurist identity of the narrator and in his distinction between zâhir (external) and bâtin (internal) preconditions. He also applied the same distinction to his discussion on the inqit①(interruption in chain) by dividing it into apparent (sûratan) and figurative (ma‘nan) types. For him while the mursal kind of chain interruption refers to an apparent interruption (inqit①sûrî), and its contradiction to the Qur’ân and Sunnah refers to a figurative one (inqit①ma‘nawî). This article thus tries to demonstrate that al-Sarakhsî’s view of the Sunnah is a fiqh-centered one and that the language, conceptualization and methodology that he used in his work reflect the Hanafî shool’s view of the hadith.

The usûl-i fiqh literature has two different writing methods in the first period as “the method of al-fuqah┠and “the method of al-mutakallimîn”. The method of al-fuqahâ is known with regard to al-Hanafîs and considered as giving a great place to the furû problems yet the method of al-mutakallimîn is known with regard of al-Shâfitis and considered as giving a very little place to the furû problems. It is necessary to obtain that this methods are effective or not samely on the literature of furû fiqh. In this article we tried to study how the usul rules are used in furû literature within the three famous commentaries of al-Nawawî’s al-Minhâc in the Shâfiî echole.

Historians almost totally neglect the ongoing impact of Ottomanism on Turkish-Arab relations after the defeat of the Ottoman state and its withdrawal from the last predominantly Arabic-speaking provinces of the empire in 1918. Academic studies that address Turkish-Arab studies consider Ottomanism as a spent and irrelevant force after 1918. The aim of this paper is to investigate the relations between Turkish and Arab elites following the collapse of the Ottoman rule in geographical Syria, Iraq and the Hejaz. Based on the treatises between the two sides, the joint projects put into practice, the attitudes of the leaders of the movements that resist European occupation on both sides of the armistice line, and a critical reading of the secondary literature, the article argues that Ottomanist ideology continued to bear an influence. It helped efforts at political organization and especially in conjunction with the notion of the Caliphate, which is another focus of the article.

This study aims to present a manuscript work titled “Siyâsa al-Dunyâ wa al-Dîn” (The Politics of Religion and World) by Saîd ibn Ismâil Aksarayî, who was jurist of the Hanafî school. Partly an example of the Ahkâm al-Sultâniyya genre, this work is significant in terms of understanding the relationships between the fiqh and Islamic political thought. For it discusses three different topics, including faith, worship and government or state organization, together and within the same conceptual framework. The ultimate aim of the manuscript’s author is to write a guidebook for those who wish to govern Muslims to “put into practice.”

The problem of description of the individual brings a variety of philosophical issues depending on how the individual can be described. All of them are associated with the problem of universals stemmed from Plato and Aristotle. In this subject, several discussions were made in the ontological and epistemological context. In the history of Islamic thought, two important names, having his own perspective, Ibn Rushd (1126-1198), and Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) have different ideas on the problem of universal-particular relationship rising on the different foundations. Ibn Rushd, of course, is one of the biggest names in Aristotelian philosophy at all times. One of the leading figures of Salafism Ibn Taymiyya directed severe criticism against philosophy. May description of the individual constitute in itself a paradox due to it means that an individual identical with itself, should be conceived as a universal. Ibn Rushd discusses this issue and tries to produce a solution with existing-non-existing analysis. Criticizing the Aristotelian ontology, Ibn Taymiyya attacks universal-particular analysis depending on the concept of quiddity and then Peripatetic theory of description. As a result, Ibn Rushd puts forth tips of unique conceptualism and Ibn Taymiyya of unique nominalism in the analysis of this original problem. Both of the thinkers, Ibn Rushd and Ibn Taymiyya, aims to gain the method of truth and correct knowledge. However, there are some basic differences between Ibn Rushd’s concept of being and Ibn Taymiyya’s concept of being; so, these differences of wievpoint in ontological attitude, bring about some basic differences in epistemical attitude. Ibn Rushd’s basic problem is the backdrop of sciencetific knowledge; and for his reason, he focuses on the nature and the necessity. But Ibn Taymiyya refuses any ‘itself necessity’ and because of this wievpoint, critizes the concept of ‘essential’ and ‘nature’; of course, the problem of description of individual becomes a very important issue for this contraversy.